The Marginal Cost Controversy in
Intellectual Property
John F Duffyt
In 1938, Harold Hotelling formally advanced the position that "the
optimum of the general welfare corresponds to the sale of everything at
marginal cost."' To reach this optimum, Hotelling argued, general government revenues should "be applied to cover the fixed costs of electric
power plants, waterworks, railroad, and other industries in which the fixed
costs are large, so as to reduce to the level of marginal cost the prices
charged for the services and products of these industries."2 Other major
economists of the day subsequently endorsed Hotelling's view' and, in the
late 1930s and early 1940s, it "aroused considerable interest and [had] already found its way into some textbooks on public utility economics."'
In his 1946 article, The MarginalCost Controversy,Ronald Coase set
forth a detailed rejoinder to the Hotelling thesis, concluding that the
social subsidies proposed by Hotelling "would bring about a maldistribution of the factors of production, a maldistribution of income and probably a loss similar to that which the scheme was designed to avoid."' The
article, which Richard Posner would later hail as Coase's "most important" contribution to the field of public utility pricing,6 was part of a wave
of literature debating the merits of the Hotelling proposal.' Yet the very
success of the critique by Coase and others has led to the entire contro-
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versy being "largely forgotten today."N Modem regulatory policy generally
accepts that a declining average cost industry-that is, a so-called "natural
monopoly" -will not have its fixed costs subsidized from general government revenues and that therefore the industry must be allowed to
price above marginal cost so that it can cover its fixed costs.9 The rejection
of the Hotelling thesis is so complete that reputable economics encompasses the very opposite of Hotelling's view-"that, generally, prices
which deviate in a systematic manner from marginal costs will be required for an optimal allocation of resources, even in the absence of externalities.""' Indeed, in the parlance of public utility regulation, the very

phrase "marginal cost pricing" now refers not to Hotelling's proposed
marginal cost pricing and subsidy scheme, but rather to a pricing system
akin to the "multi-part" pricing system that Coase advocated as the more
efficient alternative to Hotelling's proposal." In short, modem public utility theorists generally do not recommend using pervasive public subsidies
to chase the Holy Grail of global marginal cost pricing.
Yet despite this consensus, a recent vein of literature on the economics of intellectual property seems preoccupied with the perceived problem
that prices for intellectual property may sometimes exceed marginal
cost.'2 This literature proposes the institution of significant public subsidies to resolve or at least to ameliorate the marginal cost pricing problem,
and such proposals are already beginning to affect the course of policy
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with little apparent recognition that it is a modern reprise of the marginal
cost controversy of the mid-twentieth century. The literature treats the
marginal cost pricing problem of intellectual property as a unique phenomenon, and it remains isolated from the more general literature on
public utility regulation.
This Essay is a first step toward ending that isolation. Part I begins
by establishing the parallels between the economic theory of public utility
regulation and that of intellectual property law. Part II reviews the recent
literature proposing public subsidies for intellectual property and shows
that these proposals are subject to the same objections that Coase raised
in the public utility context more than a half century ago. Furthermore,
the recent subsidy literature has not examined the important question
whether intellectual property possesses some distinguishing features that
make it a more appropriate target for public subsidies than other industries having natural monopoly characteristics. Part III addresses this question and finds that, while there are distinctions between intellectual property and traditional natural monopolies, these distinctions do not uniformly favor subsidizing intellectual property over other natural monopolies. Part IV concludes with the hope that, as the marginal cost controversy continues in the field of intellectual property, it will proceed with a
more complete understanding of the earlier controversy, and that perhaps
it can offer new insight into a very old and very fundamental debate.
I. INTRODUCTION: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AS A SPECIAL CASE
OF NATURAL MONOPOLY

In both legal and economic thought, the topic of intellectual property is typically segregated from that of public utility regulation." This
segregation is unfortunate because intellectual property is in fact just a
special case of the problem of natural monopoly, a subject familiar to
public utility regulation.

ents." Burton A. Weisbrod, Solving the Drug Dilemma, Wash Post A21 (Aug 22,2003). The motivations for this proposal are Weisbrod's observations that the "marginal productions costs [for drug
pills] are low" and that, because of patents. drug prices are "far higher than they should be, far higher
than the cost of producing the pills, and far higher than is economically efficient." Id.
14 As one commentator has noted, "[n]atural monopoly theory creeps into the development of
patent law from time to time." John W. Schlicher, Patent Law: Legal and Economic Principles § 2.14
at 2-40 (Clark Boardman Callaghan 1992). But legal authorities typically reject the analogy between
the two because they focus on the product embodying the intellectual property. which usually can be
produced competitively, rather than on the intellectual property itself. See, for example. Fishman v
Estate of Wirtz, 807 F2d 520,538 n 16 (7th Cir 1986) (reasoning that "[a] patent is not a natural monopoly in the same sense as is a franchise for the provision of electric power at retail" because the
market for the innovative product "could accommodate two or more producers"). The intellectual
separation between intellectual property and natural monopolies is also maintained in economic
thought. See, for example, Viscusi, Vernon, and Harrington, Economics of Regulation at 351-72,83146 (cited in note 9).
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A "natural monopoly" is said to be present in any market where the
average cost of providing a good continues to decline throughout the
relevant range of demand." Such "declining average cost" conditions
commonly arise where the fixed costs averaged over each unit of production remain relatively large compared to marginal cost throughout the
range of market demand. '6For example, production of electricity has frequently been considered one example of a declining average cost industry
because an efficient electrical plant requires large capital expenditures
but, once such a plant is built, the marginal cost of producing electricity is
relatively small.
There are two important implications of declining average costs.
First, the classic condition of perfectly competitive markets-a market
price at marginal cost-is impossible to achieve as a long-run equilibrium
without some sort of governmental subsidy. The reason for this result is
that, if the market price of the good were driven to marginal cost, producers would be unable to recover their fixed costs and they would not
enter the industry in the first place. A second corollary of declining average costs is that concentrating all production in a single firm is more efficient than having multiple firms undertake production." Such concentration allows the firm to realize an economy of scale by spreading the fixed
costs over more units of production and avoids wasteful duplication of
the fixed costs of production.
Intellectual property is a special case of a good with declining average cost. The fixed costs of producing the intellectual property are the
costs of writing a book, filming a movie, or researching and developing an
innovation. Once the intellectual property has been created, the marginal
cost of using it an additional time is very low; in fact, in most cases, it is essentially zero. The zero marginal cost of copyrighted works is easy to see
in the modern world where photocopiers, computers, and VCRs are
ubiquitous. For inventions, the intellectual property covered by a patent is
often labeled as a "non-rivalrous" good: It can be used without being consumed. But the concept of non-rivalry is identical to zero marginal cost,
for we could just as easily imagine that each use does consume-that is,
destroy-a unit of intellectual property but that another unit is instantaneously produced at zero cost.
Because intellectual property is subject to declining average costs, it
is also subject to the two effects discussed above. Indeed, these effects are
15 Formally, the concept of "subadditivity" is used to define natural monopoly, but declining average cost is a sufficient condition for the existence of a natural monopoly. See Viscusi, Vernon, and
Harrington. Economics of Regulation at 355 (cited in note 9).
16 See Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law § 12.1 at 361-62 (Aspen 6th ed 2003).
17 This point follows directly from the assumption that average costs decline throughout the
entire range of demand.The total cost of satisfying the demand (that is, the sum of each firm's average cost times the quantity produced by the firm) will be minimized by having all the production undertaken by one large firm. which will have lower costs than smaller firms.
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familiar. First, a market price at marginal cost is not a long-run equilibrium solution without some sort of governmental subsidy. Marginal cost
pricing for intellectual property could be achieved by, for example, refusing to grant exclusive legal rights. As in the case of other natural monopolies, however, that policy would mean that producers would not be able to
recover their fixed costs and thus would not produce the property in the
first place. The second effect also holds: By concentrating production of
an intellectual property good in a single firm, that firm is able to realize
an economy of scale by spreading the fixed costs over more units of production. Thus, as in the case of a natural monopoly, having only one producer of each particular piece of intellectual property avoids wasteful duplication of fixed costs. ' 8
II. SUBSIDIZED MARGINAL COST PRICING FOR INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY: OLD PROBLEMS AND NEW VARIATIONS

Hotelling's marginal cost thesis is most clearly restated in Rewards
versus Intellectual Property Rights by Steven Shavell and Tanguy van
Ypersele." Like Hotelling, Shavell and van Ypersele argue in favor of a
system of public subsidies to cover the fixed costs of several major industries. These subsidies would come in the form of rewards for intellectual
property production rather than as payments to cover the fixed costs of
public utilities. But in all other respects, the proposals broadly parallel
each other. In both, the payment of fixed costs comes from general government revenues and would, if fully implemented, require significant
government expenditures. And in both, the goal of the system is to drive
price down to marginal cost across a broad range of industries. Hotelling
wanted to achieve marginal cost pricing for the products of "electric
power plants, waterworks, railroad, and other industries in which the fixed
costs are large."2 ' Shavell and van Ypersele target "drugs..., all computer
software. . . , and electronically recorded materials."2' Different industries
have been chosen, but the tools and goals are the same. As shown in

I leave for later discussion the issue of degree of monopoly. The recent literature has generI
ally described intellectual property rights as conferring "monopoly power." See text accompanying
note 57.To a certain extent, that description is always accurate and, for purposes of elucidating the
basic analogy here. I indulge it. However, as discussed below in Part III.D, the degree of monopoly
conferred by intellectual property rights is often far less than that considered to warrant concern in
other areas of the economy.
19 Shavell and van Ypersele, 44 J L & Econ 525 (cited in note 12). As the authors noted, id at
528 n 10, their proposal follows the suggestion made much earlier by Kenneth Arrow, who argued in
favor of having "the government or some other agency... finance research and invention." Kenneth
J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention, in National Bureau of
Economic Research, The Rate and Directionof Inventive Activity 609.623 (Princeton 1962).
24) Hotelling,6 Econometrica at 242 (cited in note 1).
21 Shavell and van Ypersele. 44 J L & Econ at 545 (cited in note 12).
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Part A below, the objections to this proposal are the same as those advanced by Coase more than a half century ago.
The recent literature also includes some innovative proposals for
administering a public subsidy scheme. As shown in Part B below, these
creative schemes are designed to address one point in the Coasean critique, but even on that point they are not fully satisfying.
A.

Restating Coase for Intellectual Property

Coase identified four basic problems with Hotelling's subsidy proposal; each persists in the setting of intellectual property.
1. Tax distortions.
The most obvious objection to Hotelling's proposal is that the government must impose taxes to fund the subsidies for marginal cost pricing
and that those taxes could "produce results similar in character to those
which follow from charging [prices] greater than marginal cost."22 Shavell
and van Ypersele do not entirely ignore this point; they note that their
proposed rewards will have to be funded through taxation, which has its
own "distortionary cost..... "Hence," they acknowledge, "the potential case
for reward is less strong than is suggested by our analysis."2
Any serious proposal to institute a system of rewards would need to
compare the distortionary effects of taxes and IP rights and to conclude
that the tax distortions were smaller than those caused by the relevant
class of IP rights. Otherwise, the same objection made by Coase more
than half a century ago would apply: The marginal cost solution could
"bring about ... a loss similar to that which the scheme was designed to

avoid, but arising out of the effects of increased income taxes."'" As will be
discussed in Part III.D, there are good reasons to think that the monopoly
distortions from most IP rights are generally not large in comparison to
those caused by taxation and that they are smaller than those that would
trigger concern in other areas of the economy.
2. Government ignorance: false demand and the misallocation
of resources.
One of Coase's most important insights is that, unless the government has very good information (and the will to use it), subsidized marginal cost pricing can lead to a misallocation of resources. An easy example is where the government subsidizes property that then goes unused.
But even if the property is used-indeed even if used heavily-the sub22
224
25

Coase, 13 Economica at 179 (cited in note 4).
Shavell and van Ypersele, 44 J L & Econ at 544 (cited in note 12).
Id.
Coase, 13 Economica at 180 (cited in note 4).
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sidy scheme can still lead to misallocation because consumers can commit
themselves to strategies creating demand for the subsidized good.The example Coase provides is where consumers choose a location to live knowing the government subsidizes the fixed costs of transportation. In such
circumstances, consumers may choose to live too far from the city center
because they will assume that they will have to pay only the marginal
costs of transportation. In sum, they will "choose between different locations without taking into account that the costs of carriage vary between
one location and another. ' 6'
A subsidized marginal cost pricing scheme can account for this problem only if the government has sufficient information. Even though the
government would subsidize fixed costs so that consumers are charged
only marginal cost, the government's decision to provide the subsidy
should be based on whether consumers, as a whole, would have demanded the good if they had to pay the total cost.'-The easiest example is
where the members of a community would be willing to pay the marginal
costs of a commuter train between their location and the city center.
Should the government subsidize the fixed costs of train service? The answer is clearly no if the total benefits of the train service (that is, the sum
of all benefits to all consumers) would not cover the total cost of providing the service.
The harder issue is presented where the current demand for service
does exceed the total costs of providing the service, but that demand for
service would not have been so high (because fewer people would live at
the location) if the consumers had expected to pay the full costs of service
prior to choosing their residences. The difficulty here is that, once the
consumers have settled on a residence, their demand for transportation
will appear to be real and, collectively, that demand may exceed the total
costs of the train service. But the demand is in fact a false demand. Before
the consumers located themselves in the hinterlands, their collective demand might not have exceeded total costs because, at that time, the consumers could have chosen to live closer. Thus, in assessing whether the
demand exceeds the total costs of service, the government must be able to
take into account the distortionary effects of its subsidies. In other words,
it must be able to answer the question whether consumers, as a whole,
would have demanded the good if government policy were different and
they had expected to pay the full cost of the product. But, of course, the
government will have no data to answer that question because consumers
are not paying full costs and never expected to do so. And yet, if the government cannot accurately answer that question, then consumers will

26

Id at 174.

27 See id at 174-76.
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have incentives to make decisions (for example, where to live) inefficiently and resources will be misallocated.
The parallel to intellectual property is straightforward. Just as consumers can make decisions that create demand for transportation, so too
they make decisions that create demand for intellectual property. For example, consider a firm faced with a decision whether to computerize a
certain aspect of its business. The switch to computers will save the firm
labor costs, which the government does not subsidize, but increase the
firm's demand for software and computer innovations, which the government does subsidize. In making its decision, the firm will not take into
account the full costs of the intellectual property needed for computerizing the task and will substitute computers for labor at an inefficient rate.
Shavell and van Ypersele do not totally ignore this problem; rather,
they assume the problem away by making an assumption about the government's information strikingly similar to that made by the marginal cost
theorists sixty years ago. They assume that the government will offer rewards only for inventions with positive social surplus.' This assumption
requires, as they recognize, that "the government's information [be] good
enough to screen out innovations with no value (or with no expected
value). 29 As used in this context, inventions with "no value" include not
only inventions with no benefit (such as a "perpetual motion machine" or
a worthless variation of existing technology), but all inventions where the
total demand for the invention does not justify its creation. The government must, therefore, have very good information about the demand for
intellectual property even though, in the marketplace, consumers are
never asked to pay the full costs of intellectual property.
3. Income redistribution and rent-seeking.
Another aspect of Hotelling's marginal cost proposal is that the system would redistribute income in favor of those who consume declining
average cost goods.' This effect occurs because the revenue to cover fixed
costs is derived from general taxation. Indeed, this feature is essential to
the goal of the scheme because, if only the consumers of the relevant
product were made to bear the tax that finances the subsidies, then those
consumers would be bearing the total cost of the product, rather than just
the marginalcost.

Such a wealth transfer could be criticized on distributional and fairness grounds. Why, for example, should citizens who do not consume large
amounts of intellectual property subsidize those who do? But there is
also an efficiency objection. While wealth transfers themselves do not
Shavell and van Ypersele, 44 J L & Econ at 532 (cited in note 12).
29 Id at 532 n 24.
-0 See Coase, 13 Economica at 176 (cited in note 4).
28
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necessarily have any cost in terms of efficiency, they do where individuals
are likely to expend resources seeking the transfer. The concern here is
about rent-seeking. It can be understood most clearly by considering the
appeal of a regime that promises, as Shavell and van Ypersele's reward
system does, to make "drugs ... far cheaper," "computer software ...
free," and "electronically recorded materials ... inexpensive."" That regime will appeal most strongly to those who currently consume those
goods, for they will obtain the largest benefit. But the economic efficiency
of a reward system comes exclusively from increasing consumption
among those consumers who value the good (or some units of the good)
below the price that would be charged by the right holder under the current IP system. In short, the increase in efficiency comes only from consumers who are literally at the very margin of the demand curve. But the
political pressure to adopt the system will come mainly from the inframarginal consumers, who have more to gain from the system even
though their gains are mere wealth transfers from general government
revenues.
Indeed, the rent-seeking problem is even worse in the experimental
system proposed by Shavell and van Ypersele because it would implement a reward system on only a "partial basis" with application only to
those "areas of innovation where the social losses due to intellectual
property are likely to be high, namely, where the difference between price
and production cost (after innovation) is large.' ' If reward subsidies are
targeted to particular areas, the opportunities for rent-seeking are increased dramatically, for the current consumers of particular intellectual
property products will expend resources vying to have their area picked
as the target for the subsidy.
4. Private alternatives: price discrimination and
''multi-part" pricing.
Coase's final criticism of Hotelling's proposal was that Hotelling was
not making the correct comparison: He was comparing marginal cost pricing (coupled with the necessary government subsidies) to a single pricing
scheme. But monopolists are free to rely on "multi-part" pricing, by which
lower charges would be made for incremental units.' In other words, the
monopolist could engage in price discrimination-charging more for
Shavell and van Ypersele, 44 J L & Econ at 541-42 (cited in note 12).
Id at 545. Moreover, the relevant economic question for targeting rewards should not be
whether the difference between price and production cost is large -though that question is likely to
dominate the political choice of whether to apply a reward subsidy. The right question is whether a
large amount of additional demand would be met if a reward policy were implemented.
33
Coase, 13 Economica at 174 (cited in note 4). Coase's later article. The Lighthouse in Economics, 17 J L & Econ 357 (1974), showed precisely how private business had previously used multipart tariffs to decrease the deadweight loss in the lighthouse industry. See id at 364-65.
31
32
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some units of the good than for others. If the monopolist can engage in
perfect price discrimination, no deadweight loss will occur.
Intellectual property right holders often try some form of price discrimination, which may reduce the deadweight loss associated with their
exclusive rights. The reason they do so is not altruism. Right holders have
good private incentives to find ways to minimize deadweight loss because,
to the extent that they can achieve this, they may be able to capture part
of the gains. But the effect of this privately motivated behavior is to reduce the distortionary effect of the exclusive right.
The point here is similar to that made in the above discussion of
taxation. A reward system cannot be compared to IP rights without comparing the distortionary effects of patents and taxes. Indeed, the general
issue here can be stated as simply this: Between the government and the
IP right holder, who can collect the revenue needed to pay the fixed costs
of creating the IP with the least distortion? The government has the coercive power to tax, including the power to use different tax rates for different categories of individuals. The IP right holder has the power to charge
for the intellectual property, including the right to charge different prices
to different categories of customers. Given that the IP right holder also
has the potential constraint of competition from other technology, it is by
no means clear that the IP right holder will cause greater distortions than
the government's revenue agents.
One additional reason militates against funding fixed costs through
general taxation. If left to recover the fixed costs of innovation through its
pricing structure, the IP right holder will have an incentive to improve the
business technology of minimizing deadweight loss.' Such business improvements will improve the incentives for innovation generally, by making patents a more efficient technology.'
B.

Tinkering with the Machinery of Subsidy: Refining Rewards
While Shavell and van Ypersele restate Hotelling's marginal cost
thesis, two other articles have offered more refined mechanisms by which
social subsidies can be used to drive the price of intellectual property toward marginal cost. In general, these refinements are directed toward
solving one of the largest problems associated with any subsidy scheme:
34 And, of course, a new technology in business methods would be patentable. See State Street
Bank & Trust Co v Signature FinancialGroup,Inc, 149 F3d 1368, 1375 (Fed Cir 1998).
35 Of course, if the government funded the fixed costs of innovation through tax revenue, that
would increase the incentives for the government to improve the efficiency of its tax system. But the
government already has good incentives to improve taxation techniques. Moreover, the private sector can probably outstrip the government in improving the technology of deadweight loss minimization. Indeed, one assumption of any reward system must be that government is inferior to private industry in innovating, for otherwise public financing of government research would be preferable to a
reward system. See Kremer, 113 Q J Econ at 1143 (cited in note 12) (assuming that government financing of research is ineffective).
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the poor quality of the government's information. These articles do not
reconsider the general project of subsidized marginal cost pricing in intellectual property and thus are subject to many of the same criticisms that
can be made against the Shavell and van Ypersele proposal. But the refinements are nonetheless worth examining for two reasons. First, the refinements, while clever, suffer from some flaws that may not be immediately obvious. Second, to the extent that these refinements are worth pursuing, they should not be limited to the field of intellectual property but
instead considered more generally for solving the divergence between
price and marginal cost in other fields.
1. Striving for smarter government.
The first of the two articles, Michael Kremer's Patent Buyouts: A
Mechanismfor EncouragingInnovation, proposes an interesting auction

system to solve the problem of government ignorance about the value of
an invention. Rather than trying to value innovations itself, the government would hold auctions for patents and thereby allow private bidders
to establish the price for each innovation. Of course, while auctioning
might be a good valuation mechanism, transferring a patent from one private party to another does nothing to solve the marginal cost problem.
The trick to Kremer's system is that, after the auction is complete, the
government steps in and purchases most of the patents that have been
auctioned. Of course, the government cannot use this mechanism to buy
out all of the patents auctioned because, if it did, no private party would
have an incentive to develop the information necessary to bid in the auction. Thus, some patents are simply transferred from one private party to
another, with no solution to the marginal cost problem for those properties.
The Kremer buyout mechanism has some nice features. Obviously, it
substitutes a market mechanism for the governmental welfare calculator
necessary to run a rewards system. To the extent that private firms have
better information than the government about the value of innovations,
that substitution is desirable." Kremer's proposal also gives the patentee
113 Q J Econ 1137 (cited in note 12).
Although Kremer proposes government-run auctions to provide market-based valuations
for patents, such auctions would be unnecessary for patents held by publicly traded firms. In place of
an auction, the government could simply (1) suspend trading in the firm's stock; (2) declare the patent to be in the public domain; (3) allow trading in the stock to resume: and (4) observe the difference between the pre- and post-suspension market prices of the firm's stock. The stock price difference would provide a market-based test of the patent's value, without the cost of holding an auction.
If the government paid that difference to the shareholders of record at the time of the suspension in
trading, incentives to underwrite research would not be dulled. As in Kremer's system, a stock market system for valuing patents would need certain controls to prevent collusive tactics, and the government would have to leave some patents in private hands so that market valuations remain honest. The government could also add a "markup" to increase the incentives for innovation,though only
36
37
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control over the timing of the auction, and this feature might allow patents to continue to serve what isknown in intellectual property literature
as a "prospect function": A patentee with an embryonic patent can refuse
to submit the patent to auction until the property has been sufficiently
developed; the property right can therefore continue to provide an incentive to invest in the further development of the idea.
There are, however, three especially difficult aspects of the proposal.
First, to keep the auction prices fair, Kremer's system requires a randomly
selected set of patents to be sold to private parties, and thus the government must have the political will to continue enforcing that set of patents
even though most innovations are free. This feature would be most problematic in the pharmaceutical industry, which Kremer identifies as a
"natural area to try" his buyout mechanism. A buyout system would yield
the greatest social benefits for those drugs having the largest difference
between marginal cost and monopoly pricing, and these drugs are likely
to be life-saving drugs with few good substitutes. Yet the assignment between the public and private domains must remain strictly random. The
government must be willing to allow the cure for AIDS to remain in private hands if random chance would have it. Nor is it a solution to this
problem to say that the government can always subsidize drugs that remain under patent, for, if that is so, then the government's commitment to
subsidize will distort the auction prices by raising them beyond their social value.
A second problem concerns patents that are substitutes or complements of each other. As Kremer recognizes, sequential auctions of substitute or complementary patents could distort the bid prices for the patents
in a way that causes either insufficient (in the case of substitutes) or excessive (for complements) levels of research. For example, if the first of
two complementary patents were placed in the public domain, the bidders on the second patent would recognize that the public will be willing
to pay more for use of the second patent because the first can be used for
free. Kremer's solution is to require that all substitute and complementary patents be auctioned simultaneously. '" However, one large class of
complementary patents-improvement patents-tend to be sequential,
a small markup would be needed to achieve Kremer's goal of doubling the incentives for innovation.
38 See generally Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J L &
Econ 265 (1977) (arguing that patents on embryonic ideas serve a "prospect function" because they
encourage their owners to invest in the further development of the idea). It is a separate issue
whether, under Kremer's system, a patentee would have an incentive to delay the auction so that the
patent could serve its prospect function. Bidders in the auction would value the patent based on the
assumption that it would remain private property because they would be required to make good on
their bids only if the patent were not going to be placed in the public domain. But the whole thrust of
the prospect theory is that the rights to an innovation may be worth more in private hands than in
the public domain.
39 Kremer. 113 Q J Econ at 1156-57 (cited in note 12).
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which makes simultaneous auctions difficult. Indeed, in an earlier part of
his article, Kremer recognizes the sequential nature of improvement patents and counts as one benefit of his system that "[p]atent buyouts will
strengthen incentives for this further development [of technology in related fields] ... because the market for a complementary invention will be
larger if the original invention is sold at marginal cost." 'That passage assumes that the patent on the original invention will be auctioned separately from the later complementary patent even though, as Kremer later
recognizes, such a separate auction may create excessive incentives for research into complements.
The problem of patented substitutes and complements is, however,
only a special manifestation of the more general distortion caused by the
subsidy. Subsidizing patents can distort the market price (in other words,
the auction price) for a patented substitute or complement not because
the substitute or complement is patented, but merely because it is a substitute or complement. This third and final difficulty with Kremer's buyout proposal is in fact just a recapitulation of one point in Coase's critique
of Hotelling-that the social subsidies needed to produce marginal cost
pricing can create resource misallocations of their own. Consider, for example, a patent that decreases the cost of transportation; complements to
that patent include not only improvements to that particular technology
but also homes built far from a city center. If the homes and the patent
are not auctioned together, parties will bid up the price of homes (and,
more importantly, build more homes) in anticipation that the patented
technology is likely to be subsidized. The result is the same as if the complements were both patents: The subsidies can create excessive incentives
for creating the complements (and also insufficient incentives to create
substitutes, such as homes in the city).
While Kremer recognizes the problem of substitute and complementary patents and tries to construct his auction mechanism so that the auction prices of patents are not distorted by the social subsidy system, he
does not recognize that investments in patents are only one particular
type of capital investment that may suffer distortions caused by the subsidies. The problem is general, and the solutions proposed by Kremer for
substitute and complementary patents-for example, simultaneous auctions-cannot realistically be extended over the full range of all substitutes and complements for a patented technology.
2. Hoping for a dumber private sector.
In PerfectingPatent Prizes,Michael Abramowicz proposes an alternative way to refine social subsidies for intellectual property.4 ' Like
4
41

Id at 1152.
Abramowicz, 56 Vand L Rev 115 (cited in note 12).
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Kremer, Abramowicz proposes an interesting solution to the problem of
government ignorance but, rather than trying to make the government's
information better, Abramowicz suggests making the private parties' information worse. Abramowicz's insight is that "flawed governmental decisionmaking in awarding prizes... [is] of concern only if the government's
biases are predictable in advance." If a government agency is charged
with rewarding meritorious activity and private parties have very poor information about how the government will grant these rewards, then the
private parties may assume that all deviations from the stated goal of rewarding merit will be just random and unpredictable noise. Because private parties will respond to the expected (that is, average) reward and because government errors will (by hypothesis) average to zero, private parties will behave as if the government rewarded only the desirable behavior. The trick, then, under Abramowicz's system, is to inform private parties of the goals of the reward system but otherwise to keep them as ignorant as possible about its details." Thus, Abramowicz suggests that Congress should authorize an agency to grant rewards for any "action to reduce the deadweight cost of patents," but that the rewards should be conferred only long after the relevant action, so that the structure, processes,
and composition of the agency remain mysteries to the parties at the time
they are taking the actions justifying the reward."
The first point to notice about Abramowicz's system is that there is
no need to limit the proposal to rewards for "reduc[ing] the deadweight
cost of patents." Techniques for reducing deadweight loss may be public
goods, but so too are innovations. If Abramowicz's delayed reward system
works, it can be used not to supplement but to supplant the patent system; the meritorious behavior targeted for rewards would be innovation
itself rather than reduction of deadweight loss. Indeed, it could also be
applied to other fields of natural monopoly or even to government procurement.
The question then becomes not why has a delayed reward system not
been applied to minimizing the deadweight loss from patents, but why has
such a system not been applied more generally to encourage conduct that
the government is willing to subsidize. At least one partial answer may be
that government decisionmakers-particularly decisionmakers unconstrained by any rules or by any criteria for evaluation-tend to have one
bias that is predictable and hard to eliminate:Those decisionmakers tend
Id at 218.
At times, Abramowicz frames his proposal as a plea for "flexibility." Thus, for example, he
champions "agency flexibility" in part because "it would allow different approaches to reducing
deadweight loss to be used in different circumstances." Id at 219. But in fact his proposal requires not
only agency flexibility but also agency unpredictability. If the agency were merely flexible- that is. if
it could choose amongst a variety of approaches to fit particular circumstances but its choices were
predictable-then private parties would know the agency's biases.
44 Id at 212.
42

43
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to be influenced by lobbying. If that is a significant problem, then the
rights to prizes would be little more than licenses to lobby; they would
not be worth much and few people would invest much in the activity
needed to create the claim. Rather, parties would invest heavily in swaying the governmental decisionmakers.
Indeed, while Abramowicz calls for a "pilot program" in which an
agency has "a great deal of flexibility" in granting rewards, there is in fact
already experience with such a program. In 1991, the Federal Communications Commission-an administrative agency that, consistent with
Abramowicz's suggestions, is both independent and relatively unconstrained by statute-began an experiment known as the "pioneer preference program."" The program was intended to "reward[] those who develop new frequency-based services" and to "encourag[e] entrepreneurs
and venture capitalists to invest time and money in new services and any
related technologies." ' The rewards for innovation would be licenses to
valuable spectrum, and the Commission retained flexibility as to how it
would ultimately grant these rewards. Within a few years, the program became controversial because of the enormous lobbying efforts of firms
seeking rewards, 7 and in 1997, Congress barred the agency from continuing the program.4

Of course, one such failure does not prove the impossibility of constructing a governmental reward system for which "the best way to obtain
a claim on a prize is through actual scientific research, rather than
through lobbying.". But it does suggest that patent prizes may be difficult
to perfect.

45 See In the Matter of Establishment of Procedures to Provide a Preference to Applicants
Proposing an Allocation for New Services, 6 FCC Rec 3488,3498 (1991).
46 In the Matter of the Establishment of Procedures to Provide a Preference to Applicants
Proposing an Allocation for New Services, Notice of Proposed Rule Making, 5 FCC Rec 2766,276667 (1990).
47 See In the Matter of Review of the Pioneer's Preference Rules and In the Matter of
Amendment of the Commission's Rules to Establish New Personal Communications Services, 9 FCC
Rec 4055, 4064 (1994) (reviewing the propriety of the extensive lobbying efforts by candidates for
pioneer preference rewards). See also Sandra Sugawara, FCC Faces Probe on Award of Wireless
Phone Rights;4 PCS Firms Deny Pressure'forLicenses,Wash Post B1l (May 5,1994) (noting a congressional inquiry into whether "the agency's decision to grant so-called 'pioneer preference' status
to [four] companies was the result of 'political and lobbying pressure').
48
Balanced Budget Act of 1997 § 3002. Pub L No 105-33,111 Stat 251.259, codified at 47 USC
§ 309j)(13)(F) (2000). See also Federal Communications Commission, Pioneer's Preference Rules,
62 Fed Reg 48951.48951-52 (1997) (amending 47 CFR §§ 0.241,1.402, and 5.207 by repealing authority to continue the pioneer preference program); John E Duffy, The FCC andthe Patent System: Progressive Ideals Jacksonian Realism, and the Technology of Regulation, 71 U Colo L Rev 1071,1142-45
(2000) (describing the failure of the pioneer preference program).
49 Abramowicz, 56 Vand L Rev at 213 (cited in note 12).
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DIFFERENCES BETWEEN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND
TRADITIONAL NATURAL MONOPOLIES

Because the current literature on marginal cost pricing in intellectual
property has ignored the marginal cost controversy of the twentieth century, it has not attempted to make the case that intellectual property is so
different from other natural monopoly industries that the government
should embrace a solution that has been generally rejected outside of intellectual property. Here we examine that issue and find that, although
the fundamental analysis of subsidized marginal cost pricing is the same
in intellectual property as in more traditional natural monopolies, there
are some differences worth noting. The differences, however, cut in opposite directions and do not establish a clear case for why intellectual property in particular should be a better target for subsidized marginal cost
pricing.
A.

Increasing the Incentives for Innovation

One argument that appears, at first blush, to be unique to the setting
of IP is that social subsidies should be preferred over private rights because social subsidies can be used to increase the incentives for investment in IP. For example, Shavell and van Ypersele argue that "the incentive to invest is always inadequate [in an IP patent system] because monopoly profits are less than social surplus," but that a reward system need
not be "systematically inadequate" in the same way."' This argument is
not, however, limited to the context of intellectual property. As the champions of Hotelling's thesis noted, the incentives to invest in declining-cost
industries are generally inadequate under a "Coase-plan," or privaterights system, because, just as in the IP case, private profits are less than
the social surplus if perfect price discrimination is impossible." Thus, in
the traditional monopoly case, private firms may have "systematically inadequate" incentives to invest in a declining-cost industry.
In fact, in the context of intellectual property, there is a good reason
to keep the incentives to innovate below the full social surplus of the innovation. As Shavell and van Ypersele note, holding out an incentive to
invent (either a reward or a patent) creates "a race among potential innovators to be the first to innovate," and "this race leads to the possibility of
overinvestment in research because the private return to being first may
50 Shavell and van Ypersele, 44 J L & Econ at 530 (cited in note 12). See also Kremer, 113 Q J
Econ at 1148 (cited in note 12) (arguing that a patent buyout mechanism should include a "markup"
that would "raise private incentives for original research closer to the social benefit created by the
invention").
51
William Vickrey, Some Objections to Marginal-Cost Pricing, 56 J Polit Econ 218,226 (1948)
(arguing that private, unsubsidized decisionmakers will fail to fund many socially worthwhile projects
in declining-cost industries).
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exceed its social value."'" Although Shavell and van Ypersele conclude
that this racing effect is not important to the choice between rewards and
IP rights," the racing effect means that an IP reward cannot be deemed
inadequate merely because it is less than the full social surplus of the innovation. Indeed, it can be shown that, in any innovation system that rewards the first innovator, setting the reward equal to the full social surplus of the invention is clearly not efficient because competition among
inventors will dissipate all of the social surplus. An IP reward system that
sets the reward equal to the full social surplus would plainly offer inefficiently large incentives.
B.

The Administration of Marginal Cost Pricing: Price Regulation
versus Withdrawal of Property Rights

Intellectual property differs from traditional natural monopolies in
one respect that does make the case for subsidized marginal cost pricing
somewhat stronger: Once the fixed costs of creating intellectual property
have been subsidized, the government has an administratively simple way
to enforce marginal cost pricing; it simply places the property into the
public domain. By contrast, even if the government covers all fixed costs
associated with a traditional natural monopoly, the government must still
administer a system of price regulation to keep the monopolist from pricing above marginal cost, and that task may be quite difficult." This difference is, of course, a corollary of intellectual property's zero marginal cost.
Holding price at zero requires not a complicated scheme of price regulation, but only a withdrawal of property rights protection.
This difference does, however, come with a cost: While the nature of
intellectual property simplifies the government's regulatory task after
creation of the property, it also makes the job on the front end-that is,
the setting of the subsidy-more difficult. To determine whether it is setting correct subsidies, the government needs to obtain some idea of the
social value of the properties subsidized, and measuring demand is typically one step in that process. Yet it may be a much simpler matter to tell
how many cars cross a bridge or how much electricity is consumed than
to determine how often an idea is used. To an extent, Shavell and van
52

Shavell and van Ypersele, 44 J L & Econ at 543 (cited in note 12).

53 Id ("Because the race to be first is a factor that afflicts both systems, and because the infor-

mation needed to address it under either seems to be of the same character, consideration of the race
to be first does not seem to bear on the comparison between reward and patent.").
54 See Yoram Barzel, Optimal Timing of Innovations, 50 Rev Econ & Stat 348,348-49 (1968).
See also Nancy Gallini and Suzanne Scotchmer, Intellectual Property: When Is It the Best Incentive
System?, in Adam B. Jaffee. Josh Lerner, and Scott Stern, eds, 2 Innovation Policy and the Economy
51,73 n 5 (MIT 2002) (noting that Kremer's patent buyout mechanism would provide excessive incentives for innovation if inventors were rewarded with the full social value of the innovation).
55 See Vickrey, 56 J Polit Econ at 232-35 (cited in note 51) (detailing the problems associated
with calculating marginal cost for non-IP natural monopolies).
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Ypersele recognize this difficulty, for they acknowledge that the administration of a reward system is "more difficult when the value of an innovation is in part that it leads to subsequent innovations."', But the question whether an innovation has been used in creating subsequent innovations is only one dimension of the problem of defining a patent's "scope,"
which also encompasses the more general question whether the relevant
innovation can fairly be deemed to be used in producing the host of various products appearing on the market. Answering that question is notoriously difficult, and the withdrawal of property rights would make it even
more so because private parties would no longer have good incentives to
meter the use of the idea.
Local versus Global

C.

Unlike a cable network, a bridge, a utility, or other traditional natural
monopoly, each piece of intellectual property typically satisfies demand
across a worldwide market. This difference almost certainly complicates
any pure subsidy scheme because the problem of providing the efficient
subsidy (or reward) must be solved not by one government but by many,
each of which has incentives to behave strategically in contributing toward the reward.
This feature of intellectual property may, however, be less relevant
for optional systems of the sort proposed by Shavell and van Ypersele.
Under their proposal, the innovator is allowed to choose between a reward and IP rights within the country. This model assumes a preexisting
system of property rights that divides IP rights along national lines and
thereby transforms a global public good into a local one. Indeed, a multinational, optional reward system can be viewed as simply changing the
market for IP-allowing the right holder to sell the innovation to countries as well as to individuals. Deadweight loss can theoretically be eliminated, but only if the IP right holder is able to practice perfect price discrimination among countries. If such price discrimination is not possible,
then deadweight loss will persist as some countries will find the price
charged for the IP rights to be above the reward that they are willing to
offer.
The Degree of "Monopoly"

D.

The recent literature on the marginal cost problem in intellectual
property tends to describe IP rights as conferring "monopoly power" or
as leading to "monopoly pricing."" In one sense, all IP rights are "moShavell and van Ypersele, 44 J L & Econ at 543 (cited in note 12).
Id at 529 (noting that "[u]nder the patent system, the innovator's incentive to invest in research is the monopoly profits he would earn"); Kremer, 113 0 J Econ at 1137-38 (cited in note 12)
(describing the patent system as creating "monopoly price distortions"). See also Ian Ayres and Paul
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nopolies" because one accepted definition of "monopoly" is "an exclusive
privilege of engaging in a particular business or providing a service,
granted by a ruler or the state."" But this is purely a semantic point. For
purposes of public policy, the relevant concept must be an economic one,
and the economic concept of monopoly is a matter of degree, not an allor-nothing proposition. Moreover, defining the degree of monopoly or
market power implicates a notorious ambiguity in economics-the definition of a market, which "remains unavoidably a matter of judgement in
some degree."' " The judgments made in defining markets and monopoly
are ultimately pragmatic ones. They are based on a sense of whether the
distortions produced in the market should be a matter of concern, and
that judgment, in turn, is based on the sense of the likely success of governmental intervention.
Thus, while the recent literature advocating social subsidies for intellectual property focuses on the undeniable divergence between price and
marginal cost caused by intellectual property rights, the relevant questions for formulating a governmental response should be whether, and to
what extent, that divergence should be a matter of concern. Here there is
good reason to believe that the divergence is usually not a matter of concern, or at least that it does not rise to the level that would create concern
in other areas of the economy. Indeed, the U.S. Antitrust Guidelines for
licensing intellectual property explicitly state that the government "will
not presume that a patent, copyright, or trade secret necessarily confers
market power upon its owner."6 ' The Guidelines recognize that
"[a]lthough the intellectual property right confers the power to exclude
with respect to the specific product, process, or work in question, there
will often be sufficient actual or potential close substitutes for such product, process, or work to prevent the exercise of market power."6'2 Com-

Klemperer, Limiting Patentees' Market Power without Reducing Innovation Incentives: The Perverse
Benefits of Uncertaintyand Non-injunctive Remedies, 97 Mich L Rev 985,987 (1999) ("Legal scholars
have failed to appreciate that unconstrained monopoly pricing is not a cost-justified means of rewarding patentees.").
58 See Webster's New Twentieth Century Dictionary (Simon and Schuster 2d ed 1983)
(definition 2).
59 See William G. Shepherd, Market Share, in John Eatwell, Murray Milgate, and Peter K.
Newman, eds, 3 The New Palgrave:A Dictionary of Economics 335,336 (Macmillan 1998).
6) See Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual PropertyLaw, 75 Tex L
Rev 989,996 (1997):
[lI]ntellectual property rights ... allow the intellectual property owner to raise the price of that
work above the marginal cost of reproducing it. Indeed, intellectual property rights must permit
prices to rise above marginal cost in some cases if they are to have their intended effect of providing an incentive to create.
61 U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, Antitrust Guidelinesfor the Licensing of Intellectual Property § 2.2 (1995), online at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines
ipguide.htm#t22 (visited Nov 24,2003).
62 Id.
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mentators also have recognized that intellectual property rights do not
"automatically confer market power or create 'monopolies' in an economic or antitrust sense." If this is so, then the distortionary effects
caused by IP rights might generally be small or, more accurately, small in
comparison to the expected distortionary cost of the taxes needed to fund
a social subsidy scheme.
CONCLUSION

Despite its flaws, the developing literature advocating public subsidies to achieve marginal cost pricing of intellectual property has provided
scholars with an opportunity to return to one of the fundamental debates
in economics theory from the twentieth century. The debate has now
shifted from railroads and electric utility plants to pharmaceuticals and
software, but the underlying economic issues are similar. This Essay has
suggested that this new scholarship would be better if it acknowledged
the similarity between the marginal cost controversy of today and that of
the past. Such an acknowledgment is important because, if the new literature can provide an answer to the marginal cost problem in the field of intellectual property, that answer is likely to apply to a broad range of industries.
More generally, however, this new marginal cost controversy should
be welcomed. Revisiting fundamental debates always holds out the possibility of fresh insight, and we should not be Pollyannish about our current
system of intellectual property. That system is itself an experiment no
more than a half millennium old, and it continues to evolve. The champions of intellectual property should not become Luddites when it comes to
improving the legal technology of encouraging creativity. Still, we can
hope that regulatory innovators will proceed with a full understanding of
the scope of the problem and an appreciation of the ideas of the past.

63 Lemley, 75 Tex L Rev at 996 n 26 (cited in note 60). See also Edmund W. Kitch, Patents: Monopolies or Property Rights?, 8 Rsrch L & Econ 31 (1986) (arguing that, even in the case of Xerox's
patents on photocopying, the existence of older technology limited Xerox's ability to increase its
prices).

